UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-3-2014

Kellis v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41034

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Kellis v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41034" (2014). Not Reported. 1434.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1434

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TIMOTHY A. KELLIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Appellant Timothy Kellis's petition for
post-conviction relief The order of summary dismissal should be reversed because the district
court failed to give Mr. Kellis proper notice. Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct.
App. 2009).
B.

Procedural History and Statement of Pacts

On November 12, 2008, the district court entered a judgment of conviction against Mr.
Kellis following a jury trial on twelve counts (nine counts oflewd conduct with a minor, LC.§
18-1508; one count of attempted lewd conduct with a minor, I.C. §§ 18-306, 18-1508; and two
counts of sexual abuse of a child, I.C. § 18-1506). R Vol. I, pp. 117-122. The charges stemmed
from allegations of misconduct with teenage boys, much of which occurred at Camp Grizzly, a
Boy Scout camp where Mr. Kellis worked. R Vol. I, pp. 132-133. The district court imposed
concurrent unified sentences of life with fifteen years fixed for each of the nine counts of lewd
conduct, fifteen years with five years fixed for the count of attempted lewd conduct, and twentyfive years with fifteen years fixed for each of the two counts of sexual abuse. R Vol. I, pp. 117122.
Mr. Kellis appealed and was represented by SAPD. On appeal, counsel raised two issues:
whether the district court violated Mr. Kellis's constitutional rights by imposing more severe
sentences as punishment for his continued assertion of innocence and whether the district court
imposed excessive sentences. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published decision and the
remittitur issued on May 4, 2010. R Vol. I, pp. 132-139.

Mr. Kellis filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on August 27, 2010. R Vol. I,
pp. 14-52. The district court appointed counsel who filed an amended and a second amended
petition. R Vol. I, pp. 185, 191-197; Vol. II, pp. 313-320. Ultimately, the district court granted
the state's motion for summary disposition, denying Mr. Kellis relief. R Vol. II, pp. 425-441. A
final judgment was entered. R Vol. II, pp. 423-424. And, this appeal timely followed. R Vol. II,
pp. 442-445.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Kellis's petition without proper
notice per LC. § l 9-4906(b )?

IV. ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Petition Without Proper Notice
The district court dismissed Mr. Kellis's petition for post-conviction relief in part on
grounds other than the grounds set out in the state's motion for summary disposition. Therefore,
the dismissal was in part sua sponte and without proper notice. The appropriate remedy is
reversal of the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
The applicable law is set out in Buss v. State, supra:
Pursuant to LC. § 19-4906(b), the district court may sua sponte dismiss an
applicant's post-conviction claims if the court provides the applicant with notice
of its intent to do so, the ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be
dismissed, and twenty days for the applicant to respond. Pursuant to I.C. § 194906(c), if the state files and serves a properly supported motion to dismiss,
further notice from the court is ordinarily unnecessary. Saykhamchone v. State,
127 Idaho 319,322,900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). The reason that subsection (b),
but not section (c), requires a twenty-day notice by the court of intent to dismiss is
that, under subsection (c), the motion itself serves as notice that summary
dismissal is being sought. Id. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1) requires
that the grounds of a motion be stated with 'particularity.' See DeRushe v. State,
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146 Idaho 599,200 P.3d 1148 (2009) (reiterating the requirement ofreasonable
particularity in post-conviction cases.) If the state's motion fails to give such
notice of the grounds for dismissal, the court may grant summary dismissal only if
the court first gives the applicant the requisite twenty-day notice of intent to
dismiss and the ground therefore pursuant to LC.§ 19-4906(b). See
Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798. Similarly, where the state
has filed a motion for summary disposition, but the court dismisses the application
on grounds different from those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its
own initiative and the court must provide the twenty-day notice.
147 Idaho at 517,211 P.3d at 126 (footnotes omitted). See also, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,
523,236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010) ("Thus, where a trial court dismissed a claim based upon
grounds other than those offered- by the State's motion for summary dismissal, and
accompanying memoranda -- the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with
a 20-day notice period.")
Mr. Kellis's second amended petition requested relief based upon the ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel. R Vol. II, pp. 313-320. The petition set out 13
subclaims of ineffective assistance. R Vol. II, pp. 314-318. The district court summarily
dismissed the petition based upon the state's motion and briefs. R Vol. II, pp. 425-440. Some of
the subclaims were dismissed on the same grounds as cited by the state in its motion and briefing
and those subclaims will not be discussed here. However, several of the subclaims were
dismissed on grounds other than those identified by the state. Those claims, which will be
individually discussed below, were improperly dismissed because the district court failed to give
Mr. Kellis 20-days notice of its intent to dismiss. Buss, supra; Kelly, supra.
Mr. Kellis's first claim was that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and
present evidence that the four boys who made delayed allegations against him had made
immediate allegations against the camp director the year before they accused Mr. Kellis and the
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previous allegations resulted in the termination ofthe camp director. R Vol. II, pp. 314-315.
In his affidavit, Mr. Kellis averred that he now believed that the boys had made the
accusations toward the prior director and himself as a means to get rid of those they did not like.
R Vol. II, p. 341.
In his second amended petition, Mr. Kellis set out that the prior allegations and
subsequent firing of the camp director were relevant and the failure to bring them out at trial was
prejudicial because the evidence would have shown that they boys had previously disclosed
immediately, rather than waiting as they did in Mr. Kellis's case; that previously the boys had
acted in accord with their training by immediately disclosing, something not done in Mr. Kellis's
case; the boys knew that reporting would be taken seriously and action would be taken; that the
boys were not prevented from reporting in the past because of embarrassment or timidity; and
that the boys had previously been questioned by adults regarding inappropriate conduct and were
not afraid of such questioning. R Vol. II p. 315. Mr Kellis supported his petition with, among
other items, a letter he had written to Tim McCandles during the investigation of the allegations
against the prior camp director. R Vol. II, p. 359-360.
The state moved for summary disposition of this claim on the general basis that all the
subclaims failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding deficient performance and
prejudice. R Vol. II, p. 199. In particular, the state argued as to this first subclaim that the letter
Mr. Kellis alleged he sent to Mr. McCandles did not support the assertion that the four boys
made prior inappropriate touching allegations, implied that the letter was likely manufactured
after the fact to support the petition, and stated that the letter was never actually received by the
Boy Scouts. The state also asserted that the letter, even if genuine, did not support an attack on
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the boys' credibility because it concerned only two of the four accusers and because the letter
only claimed that the prior camp director had looked into their tent without permission and had
entered another camper's tent without permission and looked through a bag, and therefore "this
claim is without merit." R Vol. I, p. 209-210.
In response, Mr. Kellis deposed Mr. McCandles and both Mr. Kellis and counsel filed
affidavits and related materials including letters from the Scouts to the prior director supporting
the claim that the same accusers had previously accused the camp director of sexual misconduct.
The materials demonstrated that the director was accused and dismissed from the camp for
inappropriately grabbing the front of a Scout's swimsuit, inappropriate touching, showing a lack
of respect for privacy, and exhibiting a lack of modesty in personal appearance among other
issues. See discussions of Mr. McCandles' deposition and the letter of termination to the prior
director. R Vol. II, pp. 325-342, 391-393. These materials supported the claim that had prior
counsel investigated, he would have been able to use this evidence at trial, which would have
resulted in a significant negative impact on the credibility of the accusers. Mr. Kellis also argued
that the failure to investigate and present this evidence was prejudicial. R Vol. II, p. 356.
The district court summarily dismissed this subclaim. First, the court noted that the boys'
accusations the year before against the camp director had been a "significant part" of Mr. Kellis's
trial, quoting defense counsel's closing argument on that point. The court then stated:
Kellis maintains that the individuals who accused him also brought down the
Camp Director. However, he has not presented admissible evidence to support
this claim. A petition must be supported by admissible evidence which is attached
to the petition. Roman [v. State], 125 Idaho [644,] 648, 873 P.3d [898,] 902 [(Ct.
App. 1994)]. Therefore, this claim fails as a threshold matter.
In addition, while Kellis argues that the investigation would have affected his
5

accusers' credibility, he does not argue that the investigation would have affected
the outcome of the trial. In particular, Kellis argues that the investigation would
have revealed that his accusers knew how to report inappropriate touching and
should have reported the allegations against him earlier, not that they had
fabricated their accusations. As a result, Kellis has not sufficient alleged facts to
support the second prong of the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052 (1984)] test.

R Vol. II, p. 429-430.
The district court's dismissal was on grounds other than those asserted by the state in its
motion and brief. The state focused its motion for summary dismissal on the alleged falsity of
the letter and its argument that the letter did not involve the same boys or sexual misconduct.

Mr. Kellis responded by deposing Mr. McCandles and presenting affidavits from himself and
counsel regarding the authenticity of the letter and the sexual misconduct nature of the
accusations made against the prior director. Mr. Kellis set out how this evidence could have
been used at trial along with his argument that "there is a reasonable probability that absent the
deficiencies, the outcome might well have been different." R Vol. II, p. 356.
The district court did not make factual findings that the letter from Mr. Kellis to the
Scouts during the investigation of the prior camp director was not genuine, as urged by the state.
Nor did the district court determine that the letter did not involve the same boys as later accused
Mr. Kellis. Rather, the court just stated that Mr. Kellis had not attached admissible evidence to
his petition to support his theory that "the individuals who accused him also brought down the
Camp Director." And, then the court incorrectly asserted that Mr. Kellis had not argued
prejudice. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing on grounds other than those presented by
the state in its motion for summary dismissal without giving its own independent notice and 20
days to respond and reversal is required. Buss, supra.
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Moreover, even if the state had given notice of the reasons cited by the district court for
summary dismissal, dismissal would not have been appropriate. "[I]f the petition, affidavits, and
other evidence supporting the petition allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to
relief, the post-conviction claim may not be summarily dismissed." Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho
791,796,291 P.3d 474,479 (Ct. App. 2012). "If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues." Id.
Mr. Kellis claimed that counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence that the four
boys who accused him by means of delayed reporting had earlier made a timely accusation
against the camp director. This claim was supported by the deposition of Mr. McCandles and the
letters served on the camp director notifying him that he was being given a formal, written
warning for inappropriate touching, lack of respect for privacy and lack of modesty. R Vol. II,
pp. 325-336.
This evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel was deficient
in failing to investigate and present this evidence. Mr. Kellis also made an argument, which
raised a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether this failure to investigate and present
evidence was prejudicial. Therefore, the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition.
Schultz, supra.

Mr. Kellis's third claim of ineffective assistance was that counsel was ineffective in not
obtaining the assistance of an expert who could have examined the conduct of the four accusers
with respect to whether they exhibited any symptoms common to victims of sexual abuse, with
respect to their failure to make their allegations until approximately eight months after the
alleged wrongdoing in light of their having made similar accusations immediately after
7

wrongdoing the prior year, with respect to their continued contact with Mr. Kellis after the
alleged wrongdoing, and with respect to their possible motivations to fabricate allegations. R
Vol. II, p. 316. The state moved for summary dismissal of this claim because Mr. Kellis did not
identify how the failure to consult with an expert adversely affected his case. R Vol. I, p. 213.
The district court summarily dismissed this claim because courts will not second guess a
tactical decision without evidence that the decision was based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the law or some other objective shortcoming and Mr. Kellis had failed to allege any
facts that would support the conclusion that counsel made the decision to not call an expert based
upon some objective shortcoming. R Vol. II, p. 432.
The district court's order of summary dismissal was based upon grounds not asserted by
the state. Therefore, given the absence of an independent notice from the court with 20 days to
respond, the summary dismissal of this claim was inappropriate and reversal is required. Buss,

supra.
Mr. Kellis's seventh claim of ineffective assistance was that trial counsel failed to obtain
the services of an expert to determine whether there was any physical evidence such as DNA of
Mr. Kellis on the property of the four accusers including inside their sleeping bags. R Vol. II, p.
317. The state moved for summary dismissal on the basis that not all of the incidents occurred in
the boys' tents and there was no testimony or other evidence of ejaculation so the allegation was
purely speculative, bare, conclusory, and unsubstantiated by fact. R Vol. I, p. 215.
The district court summarily dismissed this claim because the decision of which
witnesses to call is a tactical decision which will not be second guessed without evidence of
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law or other shortcomings capable of objective
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evaluation. R Vol. II, p. 435-436.
Again, the district court dismissed on grounds other than those asserted in the state's
motion and supporting briefing without giving Mr. Kellis independent notice of the basis for
dismissal and 20 days to respond. Again, this was inappropriate and reversal is required. Buss,
supra.
Mr. Kellis's ninth claim of ineffective assistance was that counsel failed to call a witness

who could have contradicted the testimony of one of the accusers that Mr. Kellis had supplied the
accuser with alcohol while on a trip to an amusement park and further that counsel failed to
object to the accuser's testimony regarding the alcohol under IRE 404(b) and the rules of
relevancy. R Vol. II, pp. 317-318. The state moved for summary disposition on the grounds that
the testimony from the accuser was properly admitted as evidence of grooming and to explain the
delayed disclosure. The state further argued that Mr. Kellis had not shown the failure to object
was objectively unreasonable or that it was prejudicial. R Vol. II, pp. 216-217. The state did not
address the question of whether counsel was ineffective in failing to call the witness who could
have contradicted the accuser. Id.
The district court dismissed this claim because Mr. Kellis had not shown that the failure
to call the witness who could have contradicted the accuser regarding the alcohol was because
counsel was unprepared, ignorant of the law, or based upon some other objective shortcoming.
The court further held that the evidence that Mr. Kellis had not provided alcohol had little to do
with the outcome of the case. The court did not address the question of whether counsel's
performance was deficient in failing to object to the accuser's testimony about the alcohol. R
Vol. II, p. 437.
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Again, the district court dismissed on grounds other than those set out by the state, and
again this was error. And, in this instance the court actually failed to even address part of the
claim. Thus, reversal is required. Buss, supra.
The district court dismissed four of Mr. Kellis's claims on grounds other than those
asserted by the state in its motion and briefing. This is reversible error. The order of summary
dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Kellis respectfully requests that the order of summary
disposition be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings including an evidentiary
hearing.
Submitted this ~day of January, 2014.

~ J i W,

id,

Deborah Whipple'Ltfl-'4
Attorney for Timothy Kellis
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on January _3_, 2014, I caused two true and correct copies of the
foregoing document to be:
£_mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
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Deborah Whipple
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